Appeal allowed. (1) The judge did not appear to have analysed fully the way that the case was pleaded and put by D. Although D had attributed his loss of control to sliding on debris, nonetheless his case was presented in the alternative as a loss of control caused by his reacting to the explosion and braking hard in the emergency unfolding before him. The judge misunderstood D's case to be based on the debris alone and he failed to recognise the alternative case. The failure to deal with the alternative case was a fatal flaw in the judgment. (2) On the undisputed evidence R was negligent in that he failed to control his motorcycle so as to prevent it crossing the carriageway into the path of an oncoming vehicle, his negligence caused the collision with the car, and the collision caused an explosion. It was clear too that there was a state of emergency created by R's collision with the car. The resulting explosion occurred in front of D. His instinctive reaction was to slam on the brakes. There was corroborative evidence of the fact that D braked heavily. Applying emergency braking while the bike was leaned over for the bend caused the loss of control and caused the bike to slide away across the road. The evidence did not prove that D was driving too close to R, only that D was close enough to have been affected by what happened to R. On the evidence the judge had erred in holding that D would not have negotiated the bend safely but for the accident. The balance of probabilities pointed the other way. D's fall occurred because he reacted to the emergency and not because he was following too closely behind R. It was not D's own fault that he failed to negotiate the bend safely. (3) There was an element of contributory negligence because if D had been a little further behind R he might have been able to deal with the situation that developed. Considering the relative blameworthiness of R and D, D was neither negligent in the speed at which he was driving nor in the positioning of his vehicle on the bend; his only blameworthiness was being so close that he was affected by the urgency of the events unfolding before him. In the circumstances the agreed damages were reduced by 20 per cent for contributory negligence.

Judge: Ward, L.J.; Lawrence Collins, L.J.; Toulson, L.J.

Counsel: For the appellant: Lee Nowland. For the respondent: Marc Willems

Solicitor: For the appellant: Express. For the respondent: Haliwells