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Accident Injury Claims and legal protection for people with vulnerable
circumstances in the UK 2 This was an appalling piece of deliberate bad driving. It occurred during the afternoon of 8th August 2006 on the A419 near Swindon. The part of the road where the dangerous driving was committed is a dual carriageway. The speed limit was 70 miles per hour. The appellant was riding a powerful motorbike travelling with another motorcycle. There was some sort of altercation with the driver of a Porsche Boxster motorcar which resulted in the appellant racing the Porsche. They were driving at speeds between 80 and 100 mph and the appellant on his motorbike was tailgating the Porsche, travelling at a distance of two to three feet behind the car. The driver of the Porsche motorcar applied his brakes. The appellant took avoiding action but could not avoid colliding with a Rover motorcar which had not otherwise been involved in this episode of dangerous driving at all. The speed of the motorbike at the point of collision with the Rover was calculated at being 85 miles per hour. The driver of the Rover suffered from whiplash injuries. After the collision it was discovered that the visor of the helmet worn by the appellant, which was both tinted and dirty, did not comply with the minimum requirements in that only nine per cent of light passed through the visor. The minimum requirement is 70 per cent. The result of that would have been that the driver's visibility through the visor was not as good as it ought to have been.
3 The appellant suffered serious injuries as a result of this accident. These included a broken femur, collarbone, shoulderblade and ribs, a punctured lung and a bad enough head injury to render him unconscious for three days. This also caused him to lose his memory as to the circumstances of the accident.
4 The learned judge identified the following aggravating features of the offence. First, the distance over which the bad driving had taken place, some two miles. Secondly, the excessive nature of the speed. Thirdly, the tailgating and the racing with the Porsche motorcar and the illegal conditions of the visor. The judge said, and correctly said, this was not a momentary lapse.
5 The appellant is 48 years of age. He has relevant previous convictions for speeding including one for which he was disqualified for a period of 42 days. The judge concluded that that disqualification must have been imposed because of the extent of the speeding over the speed limit.
6 The author of the pre-sentence report assessed the risk of reoffending as low and the judge gave him a one-third reduction in sentence to reflect his guilty plea. The appellant was employed at the time of this as a driver. He worked for Coventry City Council and that was the capacity in which he worked at the time of the offence. Mr Bevan has pointed out that this disqualification is going to make it much more difficult for this appellant to get employment on his release from prison. In support of his argument he has referred us to the guideline case of Cooksley and in particular those parts of that judgment which deal with the question of disqualification. In the course of that judgment, the Lord Chief Justice accepted the advice of the Sentencing Advisory Panel as to the length of ban. The advice was in the following terms:
“While those convicted of causing death by dangerous driving are likely to regard disqualification as an onerous part of the punishment for the offence, the main purpose of disqualification is forward-looking and preventative, rather than backward-looking and punitive. A driving ban is designed to protect road users in the future from an offender who, through his conduct on this occasion, and perhaps other occasions, has shown himself to be a real risk on the roads. In general, the Panel suggests, the risk represented by the offender is reflected in the level of culpability which attaches to his driving, so that matters relevant to fixing the length of the driving disqualification for the offence of causing death by dangerous driving will be much the same as those appearing in the list of aggravating factors for the offence itself. Shorter bans of two years or so will be appropriate where the offender had a good driving record before the offence and where the offence resulted from a momentary error of judgment. Longer bans, between 3 and 5 years, will be appropriate where, having regard to the circumstances of the offence and the offender's record, it is clear that the offender tends to disregard the rules of the road, or to drive carelessly or inappropriately.”
The guidance then goes on to deal with more serious offences which it is accepted this case does not come within.
7 During the course of argument, it was suggested to Mr Bevan, who has argued the case very capably on behalf of the appellant, that this case clearly came within the longer ban period of between three and five years. In response he has argued and submitted to the court that where the offence is dangerous driving rather than causing death by dangerous driving then a lesser period of disqualification is justified. We do not agree. The disqualification is there to reflect the manner of the driving and what indication that can give to the court as to the likelihood of future bad driving. The consequences of the driving are, in our judgment, not significantly relevant to the length of any ban. As we say, it is the nature of the driving giving an indication of how the driver is likely to drive in the future.
8 Mr Bevan also relied on paragraph 43 of the judgment where the Lord Chief Justice said this:
“We do not agree that the length of the ban should be tailored to take into account the anticipated date of early release of the offender. On the other hand we accept that to extend the ban for a substantial period after release can be counter-productive particularly if it is imposed on an offender who is obsessed with cars or who requires a driving licence to earn his or her living because it may tempt the offender to drive while disqualified.”
Mr Bevan places his submissions squarely on that point. This was a man who was a professional driver at the time he committed this offence. He has lost his job as a consequence and it would be very difficult for him to get a similar job without having his driving licence. In any event, said Mr Bevan, even if it is not, the driver getting any sort of job is going to be more difficult without a driving licence.
9 We doubt very much whether this appellant will succeed in getting a job as a driver, particularly the sort of driving he did for Coventry City Council, with a conviction for dangerous driving on his record. But for a man of 48 who was a professional driver to drive in the way that he did demonstrated in our judgment a reckless disregard for the safety of other road users.
10 In those circumstances, we find it impossible to say that the period of disqualification was excessive, bearing in mind all those circumstances and although we accept that it will make it more difficult for him to get a job, we do not think in the circumstances of this case that that is sufficient reason to reduce the disqualification further. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed.